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INTRODUCTION 
The felony murder doctrine is one of the most criticized rules in the field of 
criminal law,1 yet it remains firmly entrenched in most jurisdictions in the United 
States.2 Under felony murder rules, people who commit certain felonies may be 
convicted of murder even when they do not act with the mens rea that would 
typically be required.3 One of felony murder’s most troubling applications is to 
people who do not kill but who are accomplices to a predicate felony.4  
Accomplice-based theories of felony murder are even more problematic when 
applied to juveniles, whose culpability is “twice diminished” due to their age and 
accomplice status.5  
In 2018, the New York Times featured the story of Shawn Khalifa, who 
burglarized a house with three others when he was fifteen years old.6 The owner of 
the home was tragically killed in the course of the burglary. This had not been part 
of the plan. Shawn was “guarding the back door” while two older youth carried out 
the burglary.7 He “slipped into the kitchen and stole some chocolate candies. He 
briefly saw that the homeowner was seriously hurt, and he ran back outside.”8 For 
his participation in the burglary, Shawn was convicted of first-degree murder and 
was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).9 The case made its 
 
1. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 32–42 (AM. L. INST. 1980); see also Rudolph  
J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 766–70 (1999) 
(criticizing the felony murder doctrine). 
2. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 605, 690 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that the felony 
murder rule is “well entrenched in American law”); Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a 
Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (1990) (explaining that felony 
murder is “quite durable” despite much criticism); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the  
Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 
1431 (1994) (analyzing “how a rule of law that has been maligned so mercilessly for so long and that is 
putatively irreconcilable with basic premises of modern criminal jurisprudence has survived and 
promises to persist into the twenty-first century”); see also GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER, at ix 
(2012) (stating that “[f]elony murder liability is part of homicide law in almost every  
American jurisdiction”). 
3. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 511 (6th ed. 2012) (“The  
felony-murder rule facially applies whether a felon kills the victim intentionally, recklessly, negligently, 
or accidentally and unforeseeably.”); PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, CRIMINAL LAW  
§ 15.3 (2d ed. 2012). 
4. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 511–12 (describing the theory of accomplice liability as it pertains 
to felony murder). 
5. In Graham v. Florida, the 2010 Supreme Court decision prohibiting the sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders, the Court reasoned that “a juvenile 
offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the 
offender and the nature of the crime each bear on the analysis.” 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). In this Article, 
I posit that felony murder cases involving juveniles raise a similar issue: a juvenile convicted of murder 
as an accomplice to felony murder is less culpable due to age and due to a lower level of  
involvement—and lesser mental state—than would be present in a typical murder case.  
6. Abbie VanSickle, If He Didn’t Kill Anyone, Why Is It Murder?, N.Y. TIMES ( June 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/california-felony-murder.html [https://perma.cc/53K2-6AQZ].  
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Khalifa v. Cash, 594 F. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2014).  
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way to the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the conviction at the time.10 In a dissenting 
opinion, Judge Harry Pregerson commented on the disproportionality of the 
sentence, writing that “[e]ven the deputy attorney general in this case acknowledged 
the harshness of Khalifa’s sentence for a kid who went into a house and filled his 
pockets with candy.”11 
This story is not unusual.12 Juveniles—a term I use throughout this Article to 
refer to people under the age of eighteen—comprise a high proportion of those 
who are convicted of felony murder. The exact numbers are difficult to pin down 
because felony murder is a theory of liability rather than an independent offense,13 
but an estimated twenty to twenty-six percent of all juveniles prosecuted for murder 
are charged under felony murder theories.14 Thus, felony murder laws are a driving 
force behind the high numbers of young offenders in the United States who have 
been sentenced to spend the rest of their lives in prison.15  
Many young people who have been convicted of felony murder were not the 
actual killers but were accomplices to the underlying felonies. One survey found 
that twenty-six percent of all people in the United States serving LWOP for a crime 
 
10.   In 2019, an appellate court determined Shawn was not a major participant and did not act 
with reckless indifference in this felony, rendering him eligible for resentencing and possible release. See 
In re Khalifa, No. G057175, 2019 WL 4266820, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019). 
11. Khalifa, 594 F. App’x at 344–45 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
12. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (discussing Kuntrell Jackson’s case because it 
was a companion case); Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder 
in the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 300–02 (2012) (discussing the 
felony murder conviction of seventeen-year-old David Young who participated in a robbery where a 
codefendant shot the victim, but Young had no knowledge that the codefendant would do so, and that 
of seventeen-year-old Aaron Phillips who was convicted of felony murder for participating in a robbery 
of an elderly man who later died after two surgeries following a hip fracture incurred during the 
robbery); Alison Burton, Note, A Commonsense Conclusion: Creating a Juvenile Carve Out to the 
Massachusetts Felony Murder Rule, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 170 (2017) (describing the case of 
seventeen-year-old Frederick Christian who, along with four others, robbed three individuals and was 
convicted of felony murder after one of the other participants in the robbery “pulled out a gun and 
shot the other three individuals without warning”).  
13. Felony murder is a theory of liability, rather than a separate charge. It results in a conviction 
of murder and is not recorded differently than other murder convictions, making it difficult to track 
how many people have been convicted under felony murder theories. A proposed bill in California 
would have required felony murder to be tracked separately from other murder convictions to gather 
more data, but it was defeated in the legislature. Assemb. 2195, 2016 Leg., 2015–2016  
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
14. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 152 (1998) (reporting that one in 
five of all juvenile homicides are based on felony murder theories); AMNESTY INT’L  
& HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS 
IN THE UNITED STATES  1–2  (2005),  https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
TheRestofTheirLives.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA8K-YV2D] (reporting that twenty-six percent of 
juveniles sentenced to LWOP for homicide were convicted under felony murder rules). 
15. As of 2016, 11,745 people in the United States were serving life or virtual life sentences for 
crimes they committed when they were under the age of eighteen. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G 
PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 16 (2017). 
Three thousand and twenty-five are in California. Id. Ninety-eight percent are male and 80.4% are 
people of color. 55.1% are African American. Id. at 17. 
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committed when they were juveniles had been convicted of felony murder as a result 
of their participation “in a robbery or burglary during which the co-participant 
committed murder, without the knowledge or intent of the teen.”16  
High rates of accomplice liability in juvenile felony murder cases are due, in 
part, to the fact that young people tend to commit crimes in groups.17 
Approximately half of all violent crimes committed by juveniles are committed in 
groups.18 If one member of the group causes a death in the course of a qualifying 
felony, the others can also be convicted of murder.19 
California recently enacted groundbreaking reforms to its felony murder rule, 
narrowing its reach in cases where the defendant was not the “actual killer.”20 Now, 
in order to be convicted of felony murder as an accomplice to an underlying felony, 
the defendant must be a “major participant” in the felony and must act with 
“reckless indifference to human life.”21 According to Guyora Binder, a leading 
expert on felony murder, California’s reform targeted “the least popular and the 
least defensible” aspects of modern felony murder laws.22 Illinois is currently 
considering similar legislation,23 and other states are likely to follow. 
California’s felony murder reforms—which apply to both juveniles and 
adults—open the door to considering the legitimacy of convicting young offenders 
of felony murder based on their limited ability to assess future risk. Specifically, in 
light of criminal law’s focus on punishing people “for actions for which the 
defendant can be justly blamed,”24 adolescents’ diminished capacity to weigh the 
costs and benefits of their actions, and their propensity to engage in risky behaviors 
regardless of the costs attached, render them less blameworthy for killings 
committed by their confederates when the killing was unplanned.25 In situations like 
 
16. AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 14, at 1–2. 
17. See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 39 
(2008) (finding that adolescents are “far more likely than adults to commit crimes in groups”); Franklin 
E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271, 281 (Thomas Grisso 
& Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (reporting that “[n]o matter the crime, if a teenager is the offender, 
he is usually not committing the offense alone”). 
18. ZIMRING, supra note 14. A survey of California prisoners serving LWOP for crimes 
committed as juveniles found that over seventy-five percent reported having committed their crimes 
with at least one other person. HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WHEN I DIE, THEY’LL SEND ME HOME”: YOUTH 
SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 31–32 (2008), https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us0108_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/28BS-WQHM]. 
19. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 511–12 (describing how an accomplice to a felony resulting in a 
death would be guilty of murder, without regard to her own state of mind relating to the death). 
20. S. 1437, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted in CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) 
(West 2010 & Supp. 2019)). 
21. PENAL § 189(e). 
22. VanSickle, supra note 6. 
23. H.R. 1615, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (proposing to amend the state’s felony 
murder law to require that an accomplice to felony murder have knowledge “that the other participant 
would engage in conduct that would result in death or great bodily harm”). 
24. See SANFORD H. KADISH, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 135, 136 (1987). 
25. See infra Section III.A. 
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this, blame is ascribed to accomplices because of an assumption that they should 
have known that a death could result from their participation in the felony. Yet 
blame fundamentally “entails a judgment of responsibility”26 that is inconsistent 
with adolescent brain development.27  
In order to determine whether people qualify as “major participants,” which 
California now requires for accomplice-based felony murder, courts consider 
accomplices’ awareness of the danger posed by the felony and the actions they took 
to intervene to prevent the killing.28 To act with reckless indifference to human life, 
the second requirement for proving accomplice-based felony murder, people must 
understand and appreciate the risks their actions create and be “subjectively aware” 
that their participation in the felony involves a grave risk of death.29 An emerging 
body of research indicates that this may not be reasonable to expect  
of adolescents.30 
The Supreme Court has recognized the unique characteristics of adolescents 
in a series of cases beginning with Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case that eliminated 
the death penalty for juvenile offenders.31 The Court found that juveniles are 
fundamentally different from adults in several ways, including their inability to 
evaluate and understand risks.32 Incorporating studies on adolescent brain 
development into its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has barred LWOP sentences 
for juveniles who have not committed homicide,33 eliminated mandatory LWOP 
sentences for juveniles,34 and required that a juvenile’s age must be considered in 
the objective analysis of whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate a 
police encounter for purposes of applying the Miranda rule.35  
Adolescent brain development research has not yet been analyzed in relation 
to the “major participant” and “reckless indifference” standards that now attach to 
California’s definition of felony murder. These standards originate from two  
U.S. Supreme Court cases that limited the imposition of the death penalty in felony 
murder cases based on accomplice liability.36 However, Roper v. Simmons, the case 
that marks the beginning of the Supreme Court’s recent reliance on adolescent 
development research, categorically prohibited the death penalty for juveniles.37 
Since the major participant and reckless indifference standards have previously 
 
26. KADISH, supra note 24, at 140. 
27. See discussion infra Part II. 
28. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 340 (Cal. 2015). 
29. In re Bennett, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 627 (Ct. App. 2018). 
30. See infra Section III.A. 
31. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
32. See id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (stating that a “lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in 
adults . . . often result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”). 
33. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
34. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
35. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
36. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
37. 543 U.S. at 578. 
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applied only to death penalty cases,38 the link between these two areas of law has 
only become relevant with California’s move to import the death penalty standard 
into its analysis of LWOP sentences in 2015 and into its definition of felony murder 
in 2019.39  
Although a handful of others have examined the relationship between youth 
and felony murder,40 no one has yet considered the major participant and reckless 
indifference standards in light of the adolescent development research that has 
become central to Supreme Court decisions involving juvenile offenders. This 
Article fills this gap. It discusses a body of research that demonstrates juveniles have 
a limited capacity to perceive future risks, which is arguably a prerequisite for 
satisfying both the major participant and reckless indifference standards. It also 
examines research demonstrating that adolescents are highly susceptible to external 
influences. This susceptibility makes intervening to stop a confederate’s violent 
actions unlikely, raising the risk that a juvenile’s actions will be perceived as “major” 
or “reckless” due to limited capacities that are characteristic of youth. 
This is a topic with both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, 
this Article contributes to a body of scholarship that recognizes that, while 
problematic, felony murder laws are not likely to disappear from U.S. law anytime 
soon. Commentators have already thoroughly exposed myriad problems with the 
felony murder doctrine,41 yet there is a disconnect between the academic analysis of 
the doctrine and the practical reality that felony murder laws persist.42 In his book 
 
38. E.g., Tison, 481 U.S. at 157–58. 
39. In People v. Banks, the California Supreme Court built on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Enmund and Tison and prohibited life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences based on 
felony murder unless the defendant was a major participant in the felony and acted with reckless 
indifference to human life. 351 P.3d 330, 340 (Cal. 2015). In Senate Bill 1437, California’s legislature 
imported the Enmund/Tison standards into the definition of felony murder for accomplices who were 
not the “actual killers.” S. 1437, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted in CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 189(e) (West 2010 & Supp. 2019)). 
40. See Keller, supra note 12 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment should prohibit juvenile 
LWOP for felony murder convictions); Michael T. Moore, Jr., Felony Murder, Juveniles, and  
Culpability: Why the Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Should Preclude 
Sentencing Juveniles Who Do Not Kill, Intend to Kill, or Attempt to Kill to Die in Prison, 16  
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 99 (2014) (arguing against the application of juvenile LWOP in felony murder 
cases); Mariko K. Shitama, Bringing Our Children Back from the Land of Nod: Why the Eight Amendment 
Forbids Condemning Juveniles to Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 842 
(2013) (arguing for a categorical ban on LWOP for juveniles convicted under felony murder theories 
and stating that Roper, Graham, and Miller “call into question the propriety of ever applying the  
felony-murder rule to juveniles”).  
41. Nelson E. Roth and Scott E. Sundby’s review of the literature found that “[c]riticism of the 
rule constitutes a lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with the legal doctrine.” 
Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 
70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 446 (1985). 
42. Forty-two states, and the District of Columbia, maintain felony murder laws, whilesu states 
have eliminated them. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, MAPPING AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL LAW: VARIATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES (2018) (reporting that seven states have 
abolished felony murder). After Robinson and Williams’ publication, Massachusetts imposed an intent 
requirement for felony murder, eliminating felony murder as an independent theory of liability. 
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Felony Murder—the only academic book on the subject—Guyora Binder starts from 
the premise that “felony murder liability is not going away,” so “we should try to 
make felony murder law better.”43 Thus, he suggests that scholarship on felony 
murder should focus on exposing the most problematic aspects of the practice in 
order “to identify a principle distinguishing justified from unjustified impositions 
of felony murder liability and to reform the felony murder doctrine in light of  
that principle.”44  
While I agree, like most others who have written on this topic, that felony 
murder rules are “rationally indefensible”45 and should be abolished, this Article 
follows Binder’s recommendation and tackles one particularly problematic 
application of the doctrine. By highlighting the normative problems with applying 
felony murder rules to juvenile accomplices in light of the “twice diminished 
culpability” of this population,46 I argue for categorically eliminating the rule for 
juveniles. In doing so, I consider issues relating to blame and responsibility that are 
applicable to theoretical discussions about felony murder more broadly. 
Although a robust body of scholarship considers adolescent development 
research in relation to juvenile sentencing, scholarship considering the implications 
of this research on mens rea is scarce. Writing in 2003, Kim Taylor-Thompson 
raised this as an important area to explore further, arguing that “this developmental 
research could fundamentally transform the way that courts weigh issues of intent 
when an adolescent faces charges in criminal court.”47 Although adolescent 
development research has expanded significantly since 2003, legal scholars have by 
and large ignored Taylor-Thompson’s call to examine the research in relation to 
legal standards pertaining to mental state.48 Jenny E. Carroll renewed this call in 
2016, arguing that future scholarship should examine how “the mens rea standard 
as applied to juveniles should be recalibrated to account for what is now known 
about adolescent development.”49 This Article begins to fill this gap in the literature 
by focusing on the implications for mens rea posed by adolescents’ limited capacity 
 
43. BINDER, supra note 2, at 7 (drawing on Ronald Dworkin’s call to make the law “the best it 
can be” by considering “the concerns of lawyers, judges, legislators, citizens, and legal theorists in a 
single conversation”). Influential criminologist Nils Christie posits that the only morally “defensible 
position” is to “strive for pain-reduction” in crafting social responses to crime. NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS 
TO PAIN: THE ROLE OF PUNISHMENT IN PENAL POLICY 11 (2007). Thus, Christie argues, “social 
systems ought to be constructed in ways that reduce to a minimum the perceived need for infliction of 
pain for the purpose of social control.” Id. 
44. BINDER, supra note 2, at 6. 
45. Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84  
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 695–96 (1994). 
46. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010) (reasoning that juveniles who do not kill, or 
intend to kill, have a “twice diminished culpability” compared to adults who kill or intend to kill). 
47. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 
145 (2003). 
48. But see Kimberly Thomas, Reckless Juveniles, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1665 (2019) (examining 
reckless mental states in the context of adolescent development). 
49. Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539,  
541 (2016). 
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to understand the consequences of their actions, and fully appreciate the risks their 
actions pose, and the implications of these findings for the felony murder doctrine. 
This challenge to the applicability of felony murder rules to juvenile 
defendants is important to situate in the context of broader challenges to mass 
incarceration and the racialized systems of prosecution and punishment in the 
United States. As Paul Butler, James Foreman, and Marie Gottshalk have explored, 
people convicted of violent crimes comprise the majority of those incarcerated in 
the United States.50 In order to truly dismantle mass incarceration, we must think 
not only about reforming punishments for nonviolent offenses, but also about 
changing the social response to violent crimes. Felony murder is a good entry point 
for this broader reconceptualization of punishment of violent offenses because of 
the relatively lesser culpability of the offenders in this context. 
This Article is of more immediate practical importance as well. It is directly 
relevant to a wave of cases that are being litigated across California, as courts wrestle 
with how to give more concrete meaning to the statutory provisions of California’s 
new felony murder law.51 Many of these cases are tackling the issue of how 
developmental capacity factors into the analysis of whether a juvenile accomplice 
was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life under the 
Enmund/Tison factors. It is my hope that this Article will be useful to those deciding 
how adolescent development research should inform the law in this area.52  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the felony 
murder rule, its application to accomplices, and the limits the Supreme Court has 
drawn on imposing the death penalty in accomplice-based felony murder cases. Part 
II introduces some fundamental concepts about the diminished culpability of 
 
50. See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017) (highlighting that “violent 
crime, much more than drug crimes, is fueling mass incarceration” and the disproportionate 
incarceration of African American men); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017) (arguing that efforts to challenge mass incarceration must 
address violent crime in addition to nonviolent drug crimes); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE 
PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 5 (2015) (arguing that reforming 
sentencing practices for drug crimes will not dismantle the carceral state because about half of all people 
incarcerated in state prisons in the United States are serving time for violent offenses).  
51. See Sean Emery, California Appeals Court Decision Backs Law Limiting Who Can Be Charged 
with Felony Murder, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Nov. 25, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/
2019/11/25/california-appeals-court-decision-backs-law-limiting-who-can-be-charged-with-felony-
murder/ [https://perma.cc/YNW7-GMLN] (reporting on an appellate court decision regarding the 
constitutionality of California’s revised felony murder rule); Greg Moran, San Diego Appeals Court 
Upholds New Felony Murder Law, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2019-11-20/san-diego-appeals-court-upholds-
new-felony-murder-law [https://perma.cc/K2ST-DB3K]. 
52. This analysis is also relevant to assessing juvenile accountability for felony murder in states 
that include a foreseeability requirement in their felony murder laws. For example, Maine’s felony 
murder law requires that the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the commission of or 
attempt at the underlying felony. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 202 (West 1991); see also J.R. v. State, 
62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that the appropriate standard for assessing a 
juvenile’s recklessness is “a reasonable person of . . . like age, intelligence, and experience under  
similar circumstances”). 
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adolescents, as articulated by the Supreme Court, and considers the legitimacy of 
applying felony murder rules to juveniles in light of their unique characteristics. Part 
III dives into the heart of the analysis. There, I argue that juveniles’ capacities are 
too limited to satisfy several of the factors courts use to assess the level of 
participation and recklessness now required to prove felony murder in California. 
Part IV proposes two possibilities for incorporating adolescent development 
research into the law in these cases: (1) an individualized approach based on 
developmental principles, and (2) a categorical ban on convicting juvenile 
accomplices for felony murder. After considering some of the shortcomings of an 
individualized approach, I conclude that a categorical rule would be the best way to 
recognize the twice diminished culpability of juvenile accomplices in felony  
murder cases.  
I. THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE AND ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY 
A. Background Regarding Felony Murder 
A reckless or intentional mental state is ordinarily required to prove the crime 
of murder. Under common law, murder is defined as “the killing of a human being 
by another human being with malice aforethought.”53 Malice typically requires the 
intent to kill, the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, or extremely reckless 
disregard for human life.54 Unlawful homicides that are committed in the absence 
of malice are generally categorized as manslaughter, an offense that is punished less 
severely because the defendant is understood to be less blameworthy.55 
However, under the felony murder rule, when a death results from the 
commission of a qualifying felony,56 the defendant can be found guilty of murder 
even (in some states) if the death occurred by accident, or was done with a negligent 
or reckless mens rea.57 According to the California Supreme Court, “[t]he  
 
53. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 498 (quoting United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 454  
(D.C. Cir. 1970)). 
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 1 at 14–15 (AM. L. INST. 1980). 
55. Under California law, for example, manslaughter carries a maximum punishment of ten 
years in prison, whereas first-degree murder may be punished by death. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 192 
(West 2020). 
56. Enumerated felonies typically include robbery, arson, rape, kidnapping, and burglary, but 
these vary by state. Some states limit the felony murder rule by allowing its application only when the 
underlying felony was “inherently dangerous to human life.” See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (2017) (“A 
person commits the crime of murder if he or she . . . commits or attempts to commit . . . any other 
felony clearly dangerous to human life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the crime that he or 
she is committing or attempting to commit, or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or she . . . causes 
the death of any person.”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(3) (West 2017) (stating that a defendant 
is guilty of felony murder if, “in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in 
immediate flight from the commission or attempt” of any felony other than manslaughter, “he commits 
or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual”). 
57. See Isabel Grant & A. Wayne MacKay, Constructive Murder and the Charter: In Search of 
Principle, 25 ALBERTA L. REV. 129, 136 (1987) (explaining that felony murder rules equate “accidental, 
negligent, reckless and intentional killings”). States’ definitions of felony murder vary widely. See 
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felony-murder rule makes a killing while committing certain felonies murder 
without the necessity of further examining the defendant’s mental state.”58 This “is 
untrue to the principle of gradation proportionate to the established level of mental 
fault” that is otherwise a cornerstone of homicide law.59 Felony murder rules thus 
depart significantly from the requirement that malice aforethought is required to 
prove murder under all other circumstances.  
The felony murder doctrine removes the relevance of an individual’s mental 
state for a killing from the equation and instead transfers the mental state required 
for the commission or attempt of an enumerated felony,60 or, in some jurisdictions, 
of any dangerous felony.61 Some argue that felony murder is a strict liability offense, 
removing one’s mental state from consideration altogether.62 Whether it operates 
to transfer the intent from the enumerated felony to the homicide or functions as a 
strict liability offense, felony murder does not require that the individual have acted 
with malice.63  
Concerns about convicting people of murder absent a showing of malice have 
animated many criticisms of the felony murder rule.64 In the only academic book 
that specifically focuses on the topic of felony murder, Guyora Binder writes, 
“[l]egal scholars are almost unanimous in condemning it as a morally indefensible 
form of strict liability.”65 In its commentary accompanying the Model Penal Code, 
the American Law Institute finds that a “[p]rincipled argument in favor of the 
felony-murder doctrine is hard to find.”66 Legal commentators have characterized 
 
ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 42 (describing the different types of felony murder rules in all  
fifty states). 
58. People v. Chun, 203 P.3d 425, 430 (Cal. 2009). 
59. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1439–40. 
60. See Guyora Binder, Brenner Fissell & Robert Weisberg, Capital Punishment of Unintentional 
Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2017) (listing the most common  
enumerated felonies).  
61. See William Bald, Rejoining Moral Culpability with Criminal Liability: Reconsideration of the 
Felony Murder Doctrine for the Current Time, 44 J. LEGIS. 239, 244–45 (2017) (discussing the transferred 
intent argument regarding mens rea and felony murder); Gerber, supra note 1, at 770. 
62. But see BINDER, supra note 2, at 23 (arguing that “felony murder laws condition liability on 
negligence rather than strict liability”). 
63. See Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder 
Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507, 527 (2004) (finding that the felony 
murder rule “applies in all situations—when the felon kills intentionally, recklessly, or accidentally”). In 
the absence of a malice requirement, people can be found guilty of murder if they “cause[ ] death during 
the commission of a felony, regardless of that person’s mental state with respect to the resultant death.” 
Binder et al., supra note 60, at 1141. 
64. See Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1441 (“Thus, the major complaint about the felony-murder 
rule is that it violates generally accepted principles of culpability.”); Gerber, supra note 1; John O’Herron, 
Felony Murder Without a Felony Limitation: Predicate Felonies and Practical Concerns in the States, 46 
CRIM. L. BULL. 664 (2010) (explaining that most of the criticisms of felony murder focus on the lack of 
mens rea). 
65. BINDER, supra note 2, at 3. According to Sanford Kadish, the felony murder rule is 
“rationally indefensible.” Kadish, supra note 45, at 695–96. 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 37 (AM. L. INST. 1980). 
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felony murder rules as “‘abhor[r]ent,’67 ‘anachronistic,’68 ‘barbaric,’69 ‘injudicious 
and unprincipled,’70 ‘parasitic,’71 and a ‘modern monstrosity’72 that ‘erodes the 
relationship between criminal liability and moral culpability.’”73 
Justifications of the felony murder doctrine primarily focus on deterrence, 
arguing that the existence of the law deters people from committing felonies or 
deters people who are committing felonies from killing people in the course of the 
felony. However, most robberies do not result in homicide, or even injury, so the 
need to deter killings in the course of felonies is questionable.74 And in light of the 
fact that there is no empirical evidence that supports the deterrence theory for 
felony murder, “it is hard to make the case for the need for the felony-murder rule 
on deterrence grounds.”75 
Wayne LaFave argues that although deterrence is proffered as a reason for the 
persistence of the felony murder doctrine, the truer explanation for the rule’s 
tenacity is the unstated assumption “that the defendant, because he is committing a 
felony, is by hypothesis a bad person, so . . . we should not worry too much about 
the difference between the bad results he intends and the bad results he brings 
about.”76 In a country whose criminal justice system is inextricably tied to race, it is 
impossible to divorce LaFave’s hypothesis that unstated beliefs about “bad people” 
explain the persistence of the felony murder doctrine from race. In California, nearly 
eighty percent of those serving time in prison for felony murder convictions are not 
white, with nearly forty percent reporting they are African American and nearly 
thirty percent reporting they are Mexican or Hispanic.77 Particularly in the juvenile 
context, it is difficult to imagine that the doctrine would persist if thousands of 
white teenagers were sentenced to spend the rest of their lives in prison for acting 
as lookouts or driving getaway cars for robberies or burglaries where the participants 
 
67. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1441. 
68. Id. at 1441 & n.46 (first citing People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal. 1984), abrogated 
by People v. Blakeley, 999 P.2d 675 (Cal. 2000); then citing People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 
(Mich. 1980); and then citing State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1201 (N.M. 1991)). 
69. Id. at 1441 & n.47 (first citing Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 897 n.3; then citing People v. Smith, 
678 P.2d 886, 888 (Cal. 1984); and then citing People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6 (Cal. 1966), 
overruled by People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998)). 
70. Id. at 1441 & n.48 (citing Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 334). 
71. Id. at 1441 & n.49 (citing Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 333 n.16). 
72. Id. at 1441 & n.50 (citing David Lanham, Felony Murder—Ancient and Modern, 7  
CRIM. L.J. 90, 90–91 (1983)). 
73. Id. at 1441 & n.51 (citing People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 549, 554 (Cal. 1989)). As the 
Supreme Court of Michigan noted in an opinion abolishing the felony murder rule in Michigan, “malice 
is an essential element of any murder, as that term is judicially defined, whether the murder occurs in 
the course of a felony or otherwise.” Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 326. 
74. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (describing research on the frequency with 
which homicides occur in the course of robberies). 
75. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 513.  
76. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 682. 
77. These statistics are based on a survey conducted with California prisoners. Statistics, 
FELONY MURDER ELIMINATION PROJECT, https://www.endfmrnow.org/statistics [https:// 
perma.cc/SQ7L-8D4X] ( last visited Jan. 29, 2021). 
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did not plan to kill anyone. This practice comports with the modern trend of 
imposing harsh treatment on those juveniles who are framed as “other people’s 
children” due to racial constructions of criminality.78 
Although the felony murder rule persists in most jurisdictions in the United 
States, states have limited its application in various ways.79 Some allow only a narrow 
list of enumerated felonies to qualify for felony murder prosecutions.80 Others 
require that the underlying felony be “inherently dangerous to human life.”81 Most 
states apply the “merger doctrine,” disallowing crimes that are an integral part of a 
homicide, such as assault with a deadly weapon, to qualify as an underlying felony.82  
Felony murder is a distinctly American doctrine; other countries do not use 
it.83 Some trace the origin of the doctrine to English common law,84 but England 
statutorily abolished the felony murder rule in 1957.85 Eight U.S. states have 
eliminated the felony murder doctrine.86 Hawaii, Arkansas, New Hampshire, and 
Kentucky did so through legislative reforms. In Michigan, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
and New Mexico, felony murder has essentially been abolished in the courts.87 
 
78. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 265 (1999) (arguing that punitive policies towards juvenile offenders are fueled by the 
racialization of delinquency). 
79. See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 42 (describing state laws that require recklessness 
or negligence for felony murder); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1465 (explaining that most states have 
restricted the “broad, original version” of the felony murder rule).  
80. See Binder et al., supra note 60, at 1145. 
81. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1467. But see Malaske v. State, 89 P.3d 1116, 1117 n.1  
(Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (where the underlying felony was supplying alcohol to a minor); Hickman v. 
Commonwealth, 398 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (where the underlying felony was  
drug possession). 
82. See Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 549 (2011) 
(reporting that eight states incorporate the merger doctrine into their felony murder laws). Some 
jurisdictions do not follow this approach. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 792 (Ga. 2002) 
(affirming a fifteen-year-old’s conviction of felony murder based on the commission of assault with a 
deadly weapon and battery with injury when he punched another boy during a fight at school, and the 
victim died as a result of a brain hemorrhage). 
83. See DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 510 (stating that the felony murder rule never existed in 
France or Germany). 
84. The origin of the felony murder doctrine is contested. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 41, at 
449–50 (describing the “disputed origins” of the felony murder rule). Joshua Dressler traces the origin 
to Blackstone, which states that “if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man, this 
is also murder.” DRESSLER, supra note 3, 488 n.106 (8th ed. 2018) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 200–01 (1769)). Other accounts tracing felony murder’s 
origin to English common law include: People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 309, 312 (Mich. 1980) (citing 
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (1797)), and 
Sidney Prevezer, The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57  
COLUM. L. REV. 624, 635 (1957). Other scholars believe that the felony murder originated in the United 
States. See BINDER, supra note 2. 
85. Homicide Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 c. 11, § 1 (Gr. Brit.). 
86. See ROBINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 42. 
87. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 321–26 (“We believe that it is no longer acceptable to equate the 
intent to commit a felony with the intent to kill . . . .”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 
1178 (Mass. 2017) (holding that “a defendant may not be convicted of murder without proof of one of 
the three prongs of malice,” meaning that “in the future, felony-murder is no longer an independent 
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B. Accomplice Liability for Felony Murder 
Although the common law definition of felony murder was limited to cases 
where the defendant committed the violent act that caused death,88 twelve states 
currently specify that an individual can be convicted of murder based on 
“participation in a felony in which any participant causes death,” or where “any 
person” causes death.89 This casts a wide net, encompassing people who have lower 
degrees of culpability or involvement than in other murder cases. For example, in 
Massachusetts, Timothy Brown was convicted of felony murder for providing a gun 
and a hooded sweatshirt to an acquaintance, knowing that the acquaintance planned 
to use the items to commit a robbery.90 Although he was not present at the scene 
of the crime, Brown was convicted of murder as an accomplice to the robbery.91 
Recognizing the diminished culpability of accomplices in felony murder cases, 
the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty may only be imposed for felony 
murder if the defendant (1) was a major participant in the underlying felony, and  
(2) acted with reckless indifference to human life.92 In Enmund v. Florida, the 
Supreme Court held that a participant in a felony murder who “does not himself 
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be 
employed”93 is “plainly different” from someone who kills.94 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be 
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”95 At first, the 
Enmund case appeared to eliminate the death penalty in felony murder convictions 
based on accomplice liability. In Tison v. Arizona, however, the Court upheld the 
death penalty for two accomplices whose participation in the underlying felony was 
“major” and “whose mental state [was] one of reckless indifference to the value of 
human life.”96  
California has gone farther than the Supreme Court requires, incorporating 
these standards into its definition of felony murder. In 2015, the California Supreme 
 
theory of liability for murder”). New Mexico’s Supreme Court has ruled that an individual must have 
an intent to kill to be convicted of felony murder, which essentially abolished felony murder in the state 
by adding an intent requirement. State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1204–05 (N.M. 1991) (holding that 
felony murder “requir[es] proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim”). 
88. Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59,  
107 (2004). 
89. See BINDER, supra note 2, at 223–24. The states that require the death be caused by a 
participant in the felony are Alabama, Connecticut, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and 
Washington, and the states that require the death by caused by any person are Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, and New Jersey. See Bald, supra note 61, at 248. The distinction between “participant” 
and “any person” is made because “any person” may include a victim or third party, such as a  
police officer. 
90. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173. 
91. Id. 
92. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
93. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).  
94. Id. at 798. 
95. Tison, 481 U.S. at 149. 
96. Id. at 152. 
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Court extended the Supreme Court’s major participant and reckless indifference 
requirements for the death penalty to apply to life without the possibility of parole 
(LWOP) sentences.97 This case—People v. Banks—triggered a flurry of litigation, 
where people who had previously been sentenced to LWOP based on accomplice 
liability for felony murder petitioned to be resentenced to life with the possibility of 
parole.98 In 2018, the California legislature imported this standard into the very 
definition of felony murder.99 Now, defendants who did not actually kill may only 
be convicted of felony murder in California if (1) they were major participants in an 
underlying enumerated felony, and (2) they acted with reckless indifference to 
human life.100 
II. THE DIMINISHED CULPABILITY OF YOUTH IN ADULT COURT 
Defendants as young as twelve years old have been prosecuted in adult court 
for felony murder.101 Although the juvenile court was established in 1899 with the 
purpose of treating juveniles who commit crimes differently from adults, the 
division between juvenile and adult courts has eroded significantly over time.102 
Juveniles are now routinely tried in adult court, according to the same rules that 
apply to adult defendants.103 If convicted, they face the same sentences as adults, 
with some narrow exceptions. A quarter of the juvenile offenders serving LWOP 
in the United States received this sentence due to felony murder convictions.104 
A. The Supreme Court & Adolescent Development 
Confronted with juveniles who have committed serious offenses, and thus 
face the most serious punishments, the Supreme Court has limited the sentences 
 
97. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 339 (Cal. 2015). 
98. See, e.g., In re Bennett, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 617 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the petitioner’s 
argument that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole must be vacated under Banks). 
99. S. 1437, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
100. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (West 2010 & Supp. 2019). 
101. See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 63, at 507, 527 (discussing various cases involving 
defendants age twelve, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen at the time of the crimes). The juvenile court was 
founded in Chicago in 1899 as alternative to the adult court system, with the express goal of 
rehabilitation and reform. In the 1990s, in the context of a widespread moral panic surrounding juvenile 
crime, almost every state in the United States passed legislation making it easier to transfer juveniles 
into adult court. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRYING 
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 9 (2011). 
102. The juvenile court was founded in Chicago in 1899 as alternative to the adult court system, 
with the express goal of rehabilitation and reform. See generally Denise Wilson, Illinois Juvenile Court Act 
of 1899, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE (2017). In the 1990s, in 
the context of a widespread moral panic surrounding juvenile crime, almost every state in the United 
States passed legislation making it easier to transfer juveniles into adult court. See  
OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 101, at 8. 
103. See OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, supra note 101, at 13; CHARLES 
PUZZANCHERA, MELISSA SICKMUND & ANTHONY SLADKY, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., YOUTH 
YOUNGER THAN 18 PROSECUTED IN CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL ESTIMATE, 2015 CASES (2015), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/Transfer-estimate.pdf [https://perma.cc/74MJ-8MQ6]. 
104. See AMNESTY INT’L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 14. 
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that can be imposed on this population. The Court’s guiding principles in these 
cases have been informed by an emerging body of research that establishes that 
“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” diminish the 
culpability of juvenile offenders.105 As the Court has acknowledged, “any parent 
knows” that adolescents are characterized by a “lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”106 The extent to which these differences 
are tied to brain development, however, has only come to light in the past twenty 
years.107 Based on adolescent brain development research, the Supreme Court has 
determined that juveniles’ “irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensive as 
that of an adult.”108  
In a string of four cases limiting extreme sentences of juveniles—Roper  
v. Simmons,109 Graham v. Florida,110 Miller v. Alabama,111 and Montgomery  
v. Louisiana112—the Court has rested its legal analysis on three conclusions about 
the differences between adolescents and adults. First, adolescents are less mature 
than adults, and this makes them disposed to make “impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.”113 Second, juveniles are highly susceptible to negative 
outside influences, including peer pressure.114 Third, adolescents are uniquely 
capable of change because they are still in the process of developing, so their 
“personality traits . . . are more transitory, less fixed.”115 
Although these findings have been primarily applied to Eighth Amendment 
claims, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to carry these findings outside the 
Eighth Amendment context. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held 
that a juvenile suspect’s age must be considered in assessing whether he was in 
custody for Miranda purposes.116 Although the custody analysis remains objective, 
the Court determined that the proper question is whether an objectively reasonable 
 
105. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
106. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
107. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public 
Policy?, 64 AM. PSYCH. 739, 742 (2009) (writing in 2009 that “[a]lthough most of this work” 
demonstrating “significant changes in brain structure and function during adolescence” has “appeared 
just in the last 10 years, there is already strong consensus among developmental neuroscientists about 
the nature” of these changes); Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 98 (2009) (summarizing the growth of adolescent development 
research and the “veritable revolution” taking place in neuroscience in the 1990s involving imaging of 
adolescent brains). 
108. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. 
109. Id. 
110. 560 U.S. 48. 
111. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
112. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
113. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
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person of the same age would feel free to leave or terminate an encounter with 
police under the circumstances.117 
B. Adolescent Brain Development & Felony Murder 
Fundamental differences between juveniles and adults raise serious questions 
about the legitimacy of applying felony murder rules to juveniles.  
Although sentencing juveniles in adult court has now become the norm, 
judges express discomfort when they are obligated to impose life sentences on 
young people who have been convicted under felony murder theories.118 For 
example, in a concurrence in a Georgia case involving a fifteen-year-old defendant 
convicted of felony murder, a judge opined, “I cannot help but believe that as we 
treat more and more children as adults and impose harsher and harsher punishment, 
the day will soon come when we look back on these cases as representing a 
regrettable era in our criminal justice system.”119 A trial court judge in a case where 
a fifteen-year-old was convicted of felony murder for “passively acting as a  
look-out for other people” stated that he found the possibility of imposing an 
LWOP sentence based on his “passive accountability” to be “blatantly unfair  
and unconscionable.”120 
This discomfort from the bench reflects normative concerns with applying 
such serious punishments in cases where a defendant’s culpability is diminished due 
to both age and limited involvement in the offense. Similarly, community sentiment 
tends to disfavor the harsh treatment of juveniles based on felony murder theories 
of liability.121 Experimental research using hypothetical felony murder scenarios has 
found that people tend to favor laws that define crimes and punishments in a way 
that corresponds to the level of one’s level of involvement in the commission of a 
crime, in contrast to the felony murder rule, which treats all participants in a crime 
as the same for purposes of guilt and sentencing.122 A study that set out to analyze 
community perceptions of the applicability of the felony murder law to juveniles 
found that “community sentiment does not support the assumption that all 
 
117. The Court reasoned that “even where a ‘reasonable person’ standard otherwise applies, the 
common law has reflected the reality that children are not adults.” Id. at 274. For example, in negligence 
suits, “a person’s childhood is a relevant circumstance to be considered” in assessing “what an 
objectively reasonable person would do in the circumstances.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS § 10 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2005)). 
118. See Khalifa v. Cash, 594 F. App’x 339, 344–45 (9th Cir. 2014) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
119. Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 798–99 (Ga. 2002) (Benham, J., concurring). 
120. People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ill. 2002). 
121. See Nicole M. Garberg & Terry M. Libkuman, Community Sentiment and the Juvenile 
Offender: Should Juveniles Charged with Felony Murder Be Waived into the Adult Criminal Justice System, 
27 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 553, 557 (2009). This is particularly relevant in the felony murder context because 
the Supreme Court expressly supported its decision in Tison—a felony murder case—by reasoning that 
the community sentiment would support the decision. 
122. Norman J. Finkel & Stefanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in Capital  
Felony-Murder: The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 129 (1993). 
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defendants charged under the felony murder rule should be regarded as equally 
culpable and sentenced in an equal[ ] manner.”123 
Almost all arguments put forth in support of the felony murder rule are based 
on deterrence.124 Putting aside the many criticisms of the application of deterrence 
theory to felony murder generally,125 deterrence loses its persuasiveness in the 
juvenile context.126 Deterrence theory assumes that people will consider the 
consequences of their actions prior to engaging in a crime. Yet the Supreme Court 
has recognized that “the likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of 
cost-benefit analysis that attached any weight to the possibility of execution is so 
remote as to be virtually nonexistent,”127 rendering the death penalty “ineffective as 
a means of deterrence.”128 The Supreme Court recognizes that “the same 
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that 
juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”129 The same reasoning is applicable 
to the felony murder context; adolescents are unlikely to be aware of the existence 
of felony murder laws and are similarly unlikely to understand that their involvement 
in a felony where death is not intended could lead to someone’s death.130 
Some also argue in support of the felony murder rule based on retributive 
principles.131 From this perspective, the tremendous harm that results from a 
victim’s death justifies categorizing otherwise negligent or reckless conduct as 
murder.132 Joshua Dressler discredits this approach, arguing that “legislators must 
consider the actor’s culpability, and not simply the harm that she has caused.”133 
Equating tragic results with a defendant’s culpability is not logically consistent with 
 
123. Garberg & Libkuman, supra note 121, at 573. 
124. See David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8  
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 (1985); Drizin & Keegan, supra note 63, at 527 (“The most commonly 
cited defense of the felony-murder rule is deterrence, the hope of preventing negligent and accidental 
killings during the commission of felonies.”); Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1448 (“The primary 
justification offered for the contemporary felony-murder rule is deterrence.”). 
125. Many commentators have questioned the legitimacy of the deterrence justification, arguing 
that there is no “credible foundation in established facts” that the doctrine deters felonies or killings in 
the course of felonies. Tomkovicz, supra note 2, at 1457. Further, it is extremely rare for felonies to 
result in death. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
126. See Burton, supra note 12, at 189 (“As the felony murder rule exploits juveniles’ lack of 
cognitive ability, neither the rule’s rationales nor the penological justifications for the rule apply to 
juveniles.”); Drizin & Keegan, supra note 63, at 529 (arguing that “the felony-murder rule is even more 
problematic when applied to children under the age of fourteen”); Erin H. Flynn, Comment, 
Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156  
U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1069 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he felony murder rule’s justifications of deterrence 
and retribution fail in the juvenile context, as the doctrine neither deters youth crime nor  
achieves justice”). 
127. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988). 
128. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562 (2005). 
129. Id. at 571. 
130. See infra Part III. 
131. See Crump & Crump, supra note 124. 
132. Id. 
133. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 513. 
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the focus on mens rea as a measure of culpability that undergirds the entire system 
of criminal law. Rather, as the California Supreme Court has recognized, there must 
be an individualized assessment of “the defendant’s personal role in the crimes 
leading to the victim’s death and . . . the defendant’s individual responsibility for the 
loss of life, not just his or her vicarious responsibility for the underlying crime.”134 
For juveniles, the criticism runs deeper. According to the Supreme Court, 
“[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as an 
attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is 
not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”135  
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court found that juveniles who do not kill 
have twice the diminished culpability of others sentenced to LWOP because  
(1) they did not kill, and (2) hallmark features of youth render them less 
blameworthy.136 This same reasoning applies to juveniles in felony murder cases, an 
issue that was raised in a companion case to Miller v. Alabama.137 The Supreme 
Court sidestepped this question about felony murder, concluding only that the 
mandatory nature of the LWOP sentence must be reconsidered.138 But a categorical 
challenge to the applicability of felony murder laws to juveniles will likely be revived 
in the coming years.139  
As long as felony murder rules continue to apply to youth, incremental 
changes that exclude the least blameworthy category of juveniles from liability could 
limit some of the imbalance between culpability and punishment that arises in this 
context. Toward this end, Part III considers juvenile accountability for felony 
murder under California’s model, which preserves accomplice liability for felony 
murder in some cases while eliminating it in cases where the involvement of the 
accomplice is lesser.  
 
134. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 337 (Cal. 2015). 
135. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005). 
136. 560 U.S. 48, 68–69 (2010). 
137. In Jackson v. Hobbs, the Court was asked to consider whether an LWOP sentence violated 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when applied to “a fourteen-year-old who did not personally 
kill the homicide victim, did not personally engage in any act of physical violence toward the victim, 
and was not shown even to have anticipated, let alone intended, that anyone be killed.” Brief for 
Petitioner at i, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9647), 2012 WL 92506. 
138. Id. 
139. See Marsha Levick, Kids Are Different: The United States Supreme Court Reforms Youth 
Sentencing Practices for Youth Prosecuted in the Criminal Justice System, 70 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 25, 41–42 
(2019) (predicting that challenges to the application of the felony murder doctrine to juveniles “will 
likely continue as the doctrine, with its harsh penalties premised on youth’s limited or indirect 
involvement in the murder, appears especially vulnerable with respect to children”). There are many 
instances where a juvenile’s conviction for felony murder raises serious questions about culpability and 
blameworthiness even when the juvenile is the “actual killer,” as in the case of “the driver of a getaway 
car who kills a jaywalker” and “the robber who unknowingly punches a hemophiliac.” Binder  
et al., supra note 60, at 1141. Consider, for example, a Georgia case where the defendant exchanged 
gunfire with a store owner in the course of a robbery. Durden v. State, 297 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. 1982). 
Although none of the bullets hit him, the victim died of a heart attack. Id. at 239. The Georgia Supreme 
Court upheld the conviction of felony murder in this case. Id. at 242. 
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III. RECOGNIZING THE TWICE DIMINISHED CULPABILITY OF JUVENILE 
ACCOMPLICES TO FELONY MURDER UNDER THE ENMUND/TISON FACTORS  
Under the California approach, accomplices charged with felony murder may 
only be convicted if they were “major participant[s] in the underlying felony,” and 
they “acted with reckless indifference to human life.”140 In analyzing these 
standards, courts consider the defendant’s awareness or knowledge that death was 
likely to occur and the defendant’s knowledge of the danger posed in the felony.141 
Courts also consider the accomplice’s efforts to intervene to aid the victim, 
minimize the risks of violence, prevent the killing, or mitigate the harm in  
the aftermath.142  
These standards are problematic when applied to juveniles because young 
people do not have the same capacity as adults to evaluate the risks and to take these 
actions.143 The limited capacities that are characteristic of adolescents affect  
their blameworthiness.144  
This Part considers the relevance of adolescent development research on 
assessing two key aspects of the major participant and reckless indifference 
standards under California’s felony murder law: (1) a juvenile’s understanding or 
awareness of the risk of death posed by participating in a felony, which is required 
to establish reckless indifference to human life; and (2) the extraordinary 
unlikelihood that an adolescent would intervene to stop others from acting violently 
in the course of a crime, which plays an important role in determining whether an 
 
140. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (West 2010 & Supp. 2019). 
141. The California Supreme Court has articulated specific factors to consider in assessing 
whether an individual acted as a major participant in an underlying felony. They are: (1) what role 
defendant played in planning the felony, (2) whether defendant used or supplied any weapons, (3) 
whether the defendant was aware of the danger posed in committing the felony, (4) whether the 
defendant was present at the killing, (5) whether defendant was in a position to assist or prevent the 
killing, (6) what role the actions or inactions of the defendant played in the death, and (7) what actions 
the defendant took after lethal force was used. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 338–39 (Cal. 2015). To 
assess whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life during the commission of a 
felony murder, courts must consider: (1) “[k]nowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons”; 
(2) “[p]hysical [p]resence at the [c]rime and [o]pportunities to [r]estrain the [c]rime and/or [a]id the 
[v]ictim”; (3) “[d]uration of the [f]elony”; (4) “Defendant’s [k]nowledge of [c]ohort’s [l]ikelihood of 
[k]illing”; and (5) “Defendant’s [e]fforts to [m]inimize the [r]isks of the [v]iolence [d]uring the [f]elony.” 
People v. Clark, 372 P.3d 811, 884–88 (Cal. 2016). 
142. Clark, 372 P.3d at 884–88. 
143. The Pathways to Desistance study is the most comprehensive effort to track how 
adolescent development affects criminality. It tracked over 1,300 juvenile offenders over the course of 
seven years and identified four key differences between adolescents and adults. Juveniles are less able 
to consider the consequences of their actions, are more sensitive to rewards, are more susceptible to 
peer influence, and are less able to regulate impulsive behavior. Elizabeth Cauffman, Adam Fine, Alissa 
Mahler & Courtney Simmons, How Developmental Science Influences Juvenile Justice Reform, 8  
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 21 (2018). 
144. See Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research 
and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 158, 160 (2013) (“This argument for diminished 
responsibility is reinforced and strengthened to the extent that these well-demonstrated developmental 
characteristics are explained by normal and predictable neurobiological processes.”). 
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accomplice was a major participant and whether he acted with reckless indifference 
to human life under the Enmund/Tison standards. 
A. Juveniles’ Capacity to Understand the Risk that Death Could Result 
Adolescents are not as capable as adults of understanding the consequences 
that are likely to result from their actions.145 This limited capacity is germane to this 
context because, as Justice Breyer noted in a concurring opinion in Miller  
v. Alabama, the  
theory of transferring a defendant’s intent is premised on the idea that one 
engaged in a dangerous felony should understand the risk that the victim 
of the felony could be killed, even by a confederate. Yet the ability to 
consider the full consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s 
conduct accordingly is precisely what we know juveniles lack capacity to 
do effectively.146 
1. Research on Adolescents’ Limited Understanding of Consequences 
There is a consensus among the major professional organizations in the fields 
of psychology, psychiatry, and social work that juveniles “are less able to restrain 
their impulses and exercise self-control; less capable of considering alternative 
courses of action and avoiding unduly risk behaviors; and less oriented to the future 
and thus less attentive to the consequences of their often-impulsive actions.”147 This 
is in large part due to the fact that the prefrontal cortex of the brain is not fully 
developed until people reach their early twenties.148 This portion of the brain is 
responsible for regulating impulses, controlling emotions, and predicting  
future outcomes.149  
However, it is not brain development alone that explains the lesser capacity of 
adolescents to regulate impulses and to assess the consequences of their actions. 
 
145. See Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, 
and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Miller  
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9467), 2012 WL 174239 (“Research has shown that 
adolescents’ judgment and decision-making differ from adults’ in several respects: Adolescents are less 
able to control their impulses; they weigh the risks and rewards of possible conduct differently; and 
they are less able to envision the future and apprehend the consequences of their actions.”). 
146. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 492 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
147. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and 
National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 145,  
at 3–4. 
148. See Cauffman et al., supra note 143, at 24. 
149. See Zdravko Petanjek, Miloš Judaš, Goran Šimić, Mladen Roko Rašin, Harry B.M. Uylings, 
Pasko Rakic & Ivica Kostović, Extraordinary Neoteny of Synaptic Spines in the Human Prefrontal Cortex, 
108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 13281 (2011); Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna Choudhury, 
Development of the Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. CHILD 
PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 296, 301 (2006) (describing the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex of 
the brain). 
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Psychosocialmaturity also plays an important role in decision-making.150 Thus, 
“even after their general cognitive abilities approximate those of adults, juveniles 
are less capable than adults of mature judgment and decision-making, especially in 
the social contexts in which criminal behavior is most likely to arise.”151  
Numerous studies have demonstrated that “juveniles differ from adults in 
their ability to foresee and take into account the consequences of their behavior.”152 
In the “Pathways to Desistance” study, 1,300 adolescents were tracked over the 
course of seven years to measure their decision-making and susceptibility to peer 
influence as they matured.153 This multisite, longitudinal study found that 
“compared with adults, the adolescent’s ability to assess the long-term 
consequences of wrongful acts and to control conduct in the face of external 
pressures is severely impaired.”154 Specifically, juveniles “are less able to envision 
the future and apprehend the consequences of their actions.”155 Therefore, “it is 
less likely that they will fully apprehend the potential negative consequences of  
their actions.”156  
For example, one study set out to measure the influence of psychosocial 
factors on maturity of judgment.157 The study included over 1,000 people between 
the ages of twelve and forty-eight, making it possible to compare responses across 
various age ranges.158 Participants were asked about hypothetical situations 
involving potentially risky behavior, and they were asked to make decisions based 
on the hypothetical scenarios.159 For example, participants were presented with a 
hypothetical scenario about being with a group of friends who decide to shoplift.160 
The friends ask the participant to shoplift too.161 Participants were then asked 
whether they would shoplift if they could be assured they would suffer no negative 
consequences, if they would shoplift if they knew they would suffer negative 
consequences, and if they would shoplift if they did not know whether they would 
 
150. Laurence Steinberg, Elizabeth Cauffman, Jennifer Woolard, Sandra Graham & Marie 
Banich, Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, 
and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCH. 583 (2009). 
151. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and 
National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 145, at 4. 
152. Id. at 12. 
153. Cauffman et al., supra note 143, at 27. 
154. Id. at 29.  
155. Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, and 
National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 145, at 8 
(citing Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL  
PSYCH. 47, 55–56 (2008)). 
156. Id. at 12. 
157. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why 
Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 741, 749–50 (2000). 
158. Id. at 756. 
159. Id. at 749. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
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suffer negative consequences.162 Adolescents were more likely to engage in the 
negative behaviors regardless of the consequences.163 The study found that “socially 
responsible decision-making is more common among older participants than 
among younger ones.”164 Adolescents scored lower than adults in seeing the “short 
and long term consequences” of their actions.165 Notably the biggest changes 
occurred between the ages of sixteen and nineteen, indicating that “the period 
between 16 and 19 marks an important transition point in psychosocial 
development that is potentially relevant to debates about the drawing of legal 
boundaries between adolescence and adulthood.”166 
Another study tracked how age related to people’s decisions and risk-taking in 
a gambling task.167 Participants ranged from ten to thirty years old.168 The study 
found that while adolescents focused on possible rewards, they did not think as 
much about possible costs, whereas adults tended to consider both costs and 
benefits of their decisions.169 Numerous other studies have demonstrated that 
adolescents are less likely to fully appreciate the long-term consequences of their 
actions, not necessarily due to a cognitive inability to do so, but due to psychosocial 
factors that cause adolescents to focus more on the perceived benefits—including 
peer approval and satisfying impulses—than on the potential  
negative consequences.170  
Thus, when assessing a juvenile’s subjective knowledge of the dangers posed 
by participating in a felony, and whether a teenager would understand that death 
could result, this limited capacity to balance the negative consequences of one’s 
actions against the perceived rewards must be considered. While it may be apparent 
to an adult that participating in a violent, armed robbery could result in injury or 
death, this is not nearly as obvious to an adolescent.171  
 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 751. 
164. Id. at 756. 
165. Id. at 748. 
166. Id. at 756. 
167. Elizabeth Cauffman, Elizabeth P. Shulman, Laurence Steinberg, Eric Claus, Marie  
T. Banich, Sandra Graham & Jennifer Woolard, Age Differences in Affective Decision Making as Indexed 
by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 193 (2010). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 204, 206. 
170. In another study that presented a series of hypothetical decisions to adolescents and adults, 
adolescents were less likely than adults to assess the potential costs and benefits, bring up possible  
long-term consequences, and consider possible alternative options. Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher  
& Elizabeth Cauffman, Costs and Benefits of a Decision: Decision-Making Competence in Adolescents and 
Adults, 22 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 257, 265, 268 (2001). Even greater differences 
prevailed between adults and younger adolescents. Id. at 268. 
171. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 1691 (“Young people are risk-seekers, and yet they lack the 
maturity to think through the very real possible consequences of their risk-taking and to reflect on and 
refrain from the risky behavior.”). 
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2. Major Participant Analysis and Understanding Consequences 
To determine whether an individual is a major participant in an underlying 
felony, courts consider the defendant’s awareness of the danger posed by 
committing the felony.172 This is a subjective test, and the knowledge an accomplice 
has of a confederate’s use of violence in the past is relevant to the analysis.173 
Accomplices who had previously engaged in violent activity with their codefendants 
are thought to be more aware that death could result from their participation in the 
felony.174 For example, in Tison, the accomplices were two brothers who freed their 
father from prison.175 They knew that he had been convicted of murder for killing 
a prison guard during a previous escape attempt, causing Justice O’Connor to 
conclude that they had a clear subjective understanding that their participation in 
this felony could result in death.176 California cases have similarly considered an 
accomplice’s knowledge of prior acts of violence committed by a confederate as 
evidence of this subjective awareness that the present felony “involved a grave risk 
of death.”177 
This link between prior violence and current risk may make sense for adults 
who have reached developmental maturity. But for adolescents, this link is not as 
clear. Although the cognitive capacity of juveniles approximates that of adults by 
the age of sixteen, research has identified a psychosocial maturity gap that accounts 
for significant differences between teenagers and adults well past this age.178 This 
psychosocial immaturity means that “in situations that elicit impulsivity, that are 
typically characterized by high levels of emotional arousal or social 
coercion . . . adolescents’ decision making, at least until they have turned 18, is likely 
to be less mature than adults.”179  
To measure this maturity gap, one study administered a series of questions and 
tests to a set of 935 people ages ten to thirty, to assess the differences between 
adolescents and adults.180 The questionnaires and tests measured intellectual 
ability,181 risk perception, sensation seeking, impulsivity, resistance to peer 
influence, and future orientation.182 To assess risk perception, participants were 
 
172. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330 (Cal. 2015). 
173. Id. 
174. See People v. Medina, 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 133 (Ct. App. 2016) (finding an accomplice to a 
felony murder was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life when he had 
participated in a shooting with the actual killer days before the current offense).  
175. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 139 (1987). 
176. Id. at 152. 
177. Medina, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 791–92. 
178. Steinberg et al., supra note 150, at 592. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 587. 
181. The study used the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) Full-Scale IW  
Two-Subtest (Psychological Corporation, 1999), which “has been normed for individuals between the 
ages of 6 and 89 years.” Id. at 588. 
182. Id. at 588–89. 
First to Printer_Caldwell.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/21  10:18 AM 
928 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:905 
asked to rate how risky eight activities are.183 For example, participants were asked, 
“if you . . . had unprotected sex, how much are you at risk for something bad 
happening?”184 Although forty-five percent of adolescents between the ages of 
sixteen and seventeen had the same cognitive capacity as adults, only twenty-five 
percent had the same psychosocial capacities.185  
Research demonstrates that adolescents are, as a group, less capable of 
perceiving risks, and of making responsible decisions that balance the costs of 
engaging in risky behavior against the perceived rewards.186 This means that a legal 
standard that imputes adult perceptions of knowledge on the adolescent mind is 
likely to result in a systemic tendency to find that young offenders are major 
participants even when they do not actually have the subjective awareness that the 
standard requires. Accordingly, applying this standard to this population  
is improper. 
3. Reckless Indifference to Human Life Analysis and Understanding Consequences 
Although knowledge of the risk of death is merely one factor to consider in 
the major participant analysis, this awareness is required to establish that an 
individual acted with “reckless indifference to human life.”187 Acting with reckless 
indifference to human life means “knowingly engag[ing] in criminal activities known 
to carry a grave risk of death.”188 A defendant “is not automatically deemed to have 
exhibited reckless indifference to human life” merely for participating in an 
enumerated felony.189 Rather, “[t]he intent to commit an armed robbery is 
insufficient, absent the further ‘intention of participating in or facilitating a 
murder.’”190 Reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to kill (or assist 
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not 
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”191 A defendant must 
be “subjective[ly] aware[ ]” that his or her participation in the felony involved a 
“grave risk of death.”192 The likelihood that adolescents will have this subjective 
 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 589 tbl.2. 
185. Id. at 591 fig.3. 
186. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 81 (2008) (arguing that “the factors that lead adolescents to engage in risky 
activity are social and emotional, not cognitive; that the field’s emerging understanding of brain 
development in adolescence suggests that immaturity in these realms may have a strong maturational 
and perhaps unalterable basis”). 
187. People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 344 (Cal. 2015).  
188. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157). 
189. In re Bennett, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 627 n.7 (Ct. App. 2018). 
190. Id. at 625. 
191. Id.; People v. Clark, 372 P.3d 811, 883 (Cal. 2016) (defining the reckless indifference to 
human life standard in the context of felony murder for accomplices). 
192. Clark, 372 P.3d at 883, 887. 
First to Printer_Caldwell.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/13/21  10:18 AM 
2021]  JUVENILE ACCOMPLICES TO FELONY MURDER 929 
awareness about the consequences that are likely to flow from their actions in felony 
murder cases is slim, at best.193  
To illustrate the differences between how an adolescent and an adult would 
perceive a risky situation, in an article examining mens rea for juvenile offenders, 
Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson uses a case study of David Johnson, a  
fifteen-year-old young man who was charged with aggravated assault for shooting 
a young man who had teased him at a school dance.194 Professor Taylor-Thompson 
considers the traditional mens rea analysis of intent, purpose, and knowledge in the 
context of the case and concludes that a jury could conclude that David intended 
to kill the victim when he fired the gun into the victim’s chest at point-blank 
range.195 Alternatively, a jury could conclude that the mens rea of knowledge was 
satisfied—that David knew that death could result when he fired the gun directly 
at the victim’s chest.196  
But Professor Taylor-Thompson argues that given his youth, David’s 
“immaturity of judgment” must be taken into account in analyzing his intent, 
knowledge, or lack thereof.197 Specifically, she argues, “if an individual lacks the 
capacity to foresee a particular outcome, it cannot be said that he could have known 
the steps to take to avoid the harm.”198 His lack of life experience, due to his youth, 
combined with the more limited decision-making capacity of adolescents mean that 
while “[a]n adult might conclude that when an individual brandishes a gun, she must 
foresee the potential for its use. But an adolescent’s mind might process events 
differently.”199 Specifically, David said he knew the victim would back away once he 
saw the weapon because David said he would have done so were he in the victim’s 
shoes.200 This assumption, or knowledge, was wrong.201 When the victim did not 
turn around, David impulsively fired the gun, not intending to kill or even shoot 
the victim in the chest; “[h]e simply shot without thought.”202 While this may sound 
irrational or unbelievable when analyzed through the lens of adult decision-making, 
when considered in the context of adolescent decision-making it makes  
more sense.203 
 
193. See Maroney, supra note 107, at 114 (“Structural and functional brain immaturity also 
undermines the application to juveniles of the felony murder doctrine and accomplice liability. Doctrine 
in each of these areas reflects baseline assumptions about rationality and forethought that are inapposite 
for the typical juvenile.”). 
194. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 47, at 159–64. 
195. Id. at 161–62. 
196. Id. at 162. 
197. Id. at 162–63. 





203. Id. at 163–67 (discussing a developmental analysis of David’s mens rea that would take his 
age and developmental capacity into account using concepts of diminished capacity and  
developmental negligence). 
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This case study highlights the key differences in how adolescents and adults 
function, and it parallels the facts of many cases. In one case where a  
sixteen-year-old was charged with attempted murder after firing a gun several times 
in the direction of the victim, he explained, “I didn’t think I would hurt him. I was 
just trying to scare him.”204 This appears nonsensical to an adult, but this is typical 
of how adolescents perceive risks.  
Research confirms that adolescents do not assess risks and make decisions 
in the same manner as a “reasonable adult,” and it is therefore illogical to 
presume that an adolescent who takes part in a felony—even a dangerous 
felony—would anticipate or comprehend that someone may be killed as a 
consequence of the felony.205 
Before turning to consider how the law should incorporate this limited 
awareness into its assessment of guilt, I consider a second piece of the major 
participant and reckless indifference analysis that also raises serious questions about 
the legitimacy of applying these standards to juveniles—the expectation that they 
should intervene to stop or prevent the actions of a coparticipant in a crime. 
B. Juveniles’ Capacity to Intervene During or After the Killing 
Several of the factors in the major participant and reckless indifference analysis 
focus on whether the accused takes steps to aid the victim, or to mitigate the 
violence, once a confederate uses deadly force.206 This kind of intervention would 
seem nearly impossible for most adolescents, however, given their strong 
susceptibility to external influences. 
Teenagers are particularly susceptible to influence from both peers and 
adults.207 Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott, whose work has been influential 
on the Supreme Court, have found that “adolescents’ desire for peer  
approval—and fear of rejection—affect their choices, even without direct 
coercion.”208 The increased importance of peers during adolescence makes the 
desire to seek peer approval particularly important when groups of adolescents are 
together.209 Further, “[m]ost adolescent decisions to break the law take place on a 
social stage, where the immediate pressure of peers is the real motive.”210  
The influential MacArthur Juvenile Capacity Study specifically measured the 
kind of resistance to peer influence that would be required in order for a juvenile to 
 
204. This is an example from my experience as a practicing attorney. 
205. Keller, supra note 12, at 312. 
206. See People v. Clark, 371 P.3d 811, 884–85 (Cal. 2016); People v. Banks, 351 P.3d 330, 339 
& n.5 (Cal. 2015). 
207. Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 
43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 1531, 1536, 1538 (2007). 
208. Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of  
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58  
AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1012 (2003). 
209. Id. at 1013.  
210. ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 78. 
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intervene to aid a victim or stop codefendants in the commission of a crime.211 
Study participants were asked to select which of two opposing statements best 
describes them, specifically: (1) “some people think it’s better to be an individual 
even if people will be angry at you for going against the crowd”; or (2) “other people 
think it’s better to go along with the crowd than to make people angry at you.”212 
The study found that adolescents were much more likely to select option two and 
its equivalent and were much less resistant to peer influence than were adults.213  
In some felony murder cases based on accomplice liability, this susceptibility 
to external influences is clear from the record.214 In Shawn Khalifa’s case, which 
was discussed in the Introduction, an appellate court found that “he was simply a 
‘follower’ who was trying to put on a tough face for his older companions.”215 
Therefore, the court reasoned, “[e]ven if petitioner was in the house when [the 
victim] was attacked and knew what was going on, it is doubtful he would have been 
able to do anything about it, given his standing in the group.”216  
Similarly, Timothy Kane was fourteen years old when he tagged along with 
two older friends on a residential burglary.217 Timothy said that he participated in 
the burglary because he did not want the other boys to perceive him as a  
“fraidy-cat,” and he did not want to be left behind.218 The older boys killed two 
people in the course of the burglary.219 Rather than intervene to stop the violence 
once it began, Timothy hid under a table in the home.220 He was convicted of 
murder and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.221 
In other cases, the influence of others is not as apparent, but is still very real. 
Consider the case of Kuntrell Jackson.222 At the age of fourteen, he and two older 
boys, one of whom was Kuntrell’s older cousin, decided to rob a video store.223 As 
they were walking to the store, Kuntrell learned that one of the other boys was 
armed with a gun.224 He did not decide to back out of the plan upon learning this 
news, and the facts are silent as to how peer influence may have affected this 
decision.225 But studies have shown that adolescents are especially susceptible to the 
 
211. Steinberg et al., supra note 150, at 589. 
212. Id. at 589 tbl.2. 
213. Id. at 591. 
214. See, e.g., In re Khalifa, No. G057175, 2019 WL 4266820 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2019). 
215. Id. at *8. 
216. Id. 
217. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 181; Adam Liptak, Jailed for Life After Crimes as 
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/03/us/jailed-for-life-after-
crimes-as-teenagers.html [https://perma.cc/97Q4-FZ3D]. 




222. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
223. Id. at 465. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
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influence of their peers.226 And with antisocial peers, it is natural for young people 
to strive to fit in by engaging in antisocial behaviors that they think will impress 
their peers.227 It seems that Kuntrell may have felt torn about his involvement 
because he stayed outside the store at first.228 Eventually, he went inside, and while 
he was inside the store, one of the other boys shot and killed the store clerk. Kuntrell 
followed along and left with the other boys.229 Although not as obvious as in the 
case of Shawn Khalifa, where the court specifically labeled him a “follower,” or 
Timothy Kane, where he articulated the desire to avoid being called a “fraidy-cat,” 
it seems that Kuntrell’s decisions were similarly affected by the normal adolescent 
desire to fit in with a peer group.230  
The fear of social rejection drives much of adolescent decision-making.231 
“[A]dolescents’ desire for peer approval, and consequent fear of rejection, affect 
their choices even without direct coercion.”232 Further, adolescents experience 
more anxiety “over the consequences of refusing to engage in risky conduct than 
adults do, thanks to a greater fear of being socially ostracized.”233 For example, 
leading developmental psychologists have reported that a juvenile would be likely 
to think, “I know I’m likely to get killed, but I’d rather take the risk than be rejected 
by my friends.”234 Against this backdrop, it seems quite unlikely that an adolescent 
would stand up to his confederates—whether they are peers or older  
influencers—to stop or undermine their actions. On the contrary, in light of their 
desire for peer acceptance, adolescents would be much more likely to go along with 
the criminality even if they wanted to intervene.235  
Adolescent immaturity “often result[s] in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
and decisions.”236 The poor decision-making that characterizes adolescence is 
exacerbated under stress, meaning that in a stressful situation—as a crime would 
 
226. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 39. 
227. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5; see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 39 (explaining 
the increased susceptibility to peer influence during adolescence and concluding that “some adolescents 
may engage in antisocial conduct to impress their friends or to conform to peer expectations”). 
228. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. 
229. Id. 
230. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 38 (discussing the processes of social comparison, 
where “adolescents use others’ behavior as a measure of their own behavior,” and social conformity, 
which “leads adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that of their peers”). 
231. See Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 477, 
488–90 (1998) (“The ability to resist peer pressure is yet another social skill that is a necessary part of 
legal obedience and is not fully developed in many adolescents.”). 
232. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 39. 
233. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 47, at 153. 
234. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 163 n.102 (1997). 
235. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 38–39 (discussing the heightened influence of 
peers during adolescence). 
236. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350,  
367 (1993)). 
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certainly be—they are less likely to make good decisions.237 At a biological level, 
adolescents are more reactive to stress than are adults.238 Further, “the presence of 
peers makes adolescents and youth, but not adults, more likely to take risks and 
more likely to make risky decisions.”239  
This research explains why Shawn, Timothy, and Kuntrell did not intervene 
when the crimes they assisted with turned deadly. Moreover, it shows that their 
responses were quite normal for their developmental stage. The brains of people 
their age are wired to seek the approval of others to a much greater degree than the 
brains of adults,240 and standing up to others can trigger the rejection by peers, a 
loss of social status, and even the risk of assault.241 In this context, the desire for 
peer approval and fear of rejection becomes comparable to duress. 
Juveniles are not as equipped as adults to understand the potential 
consequences of their actions, assess risks, make good decisions, and stand up to 
external influences.242 Thus, the rules for assessing the culpability of accomplices in 
felony murder cases assume “maturity and capacity beyond ordinary adolescent 
attainments.”243 In light of this disconnect between the research and the law, this 
framework is not appropriate when the offenders were juveniles at the time of  
the offense.  
IV. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE RESEARCH & THE LAW 
I turn now to consider how the law might be reformulated to better 
incorporate the findings of adolescent development research. As Supreme Court 
Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1953, “legal theories and their phrasing in other cases 
readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a 
 
237. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in  
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 261–62 
(1996) (discussing the relationship between adolescence, stress, and decision-making); Cheryl B. Preston  
& Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role of Brain Science in Protecting Adolescents, 43 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 447, 455–60 (2014) (explaining how stress inhibits emotional regulation in adolescence, which 
in turn affects adolescent decision-making). 
238. See generally Russell D. Romeo, Adolescence: A Central Event in Shaping Stress Reactivity, 52 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 244 (2010). 
239. Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and 
Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL 
PSYCH. 625, 634 (2005); see Steinberg & Monahan, supra note 207, at 1538.  
240. See generally Catherine Sebastian, Essi Viding, Kipling D. Williams & Sarah-Jayne 
Blakemore, Social Brain Development and the Affective Consequences of Ostracism in Adolescence, 72 BRAIN 
& COGNITION 134 (2010) (describing experimental results indicating that adolescents are more affected 
by ostracism than are adults and linking these findings to adolescent brain development and 
adolescents’ greater susceptibility to peer influence). 
241. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 134 (explaining that “a youth who seeks to avoid 
confrontation when challenged by a rival may lose social status and be ostracized by peers or even by 
vulnerable to physical assault”); Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice of Adolescents in Criminal Events, in 
YOUTH ON TRIAL 371, 376 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000). 
242. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 35–46 (discussing adolescent decision-making). 
243. ZIMRING, supra note 14, at 153 (discussing that the strict liability nature of felony murder 
may not be appropriate for adolescents because of this lack of maturity and capacity). 
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State’s duty towards children.”244 The criminal law “is deeply rooted in our moral 
sense of fitness that punishment entails blame and that, therefore, punishment may 
not justly be imposed where the person is not blameworthy.”245 It is widely accepted 
that in some circumstances, people’s mental states—through no fault of their 
own—render it unjust to hold them criminally responsible for their actions.246 Such 
is the case with defenses such as insanity, involuntary intoxication, or diminished 
capacity.247 It is also the case with youth.  
Holding a young person responsible for felony murder based on an awareness 
of the risks his actions posed is morally wrong when the scientific evidence clearly 
shows that people of the same age are unlikely to be able to appreciate this risk.248 
Expecting young people to intervene when we know they are predisposed not to do 
so is similarly problematic.  
This Part explores several possibilities for resolving the tension between the 
research and the law, in an effort to avoid the “fallacious reasoning” Justice 
Frankfurter warned against.249 One option would be for courts to consider how the 
diminished culpability of youth affects each young person accused of a crime on a 
case-by-case basis, with a requirement, like that established in Miller v. Alabama, that 
courts consider the “hallmark features of youth” when assessing whether they acted 
as major participants and with reckless indifference to human life.250 Interpretive 
guidance based on relevant characteristics of youth could attach to the consideration 
of specific factors, such as the awareness that death could result. Alternatively, a 
rebuttable presumption could recognize the diminished capacity of most young 
people, while reserving the option of accomplice-based felony murder convictions 
for those whose conduct is most culpable. After discussing several problems with 
these case-by-case approaches, this Part concludes by recommending a categorical 
bar on accomplice-based felony murder for juveniles. 
A. Individualized Assessments of Diminished Capacity  
Criminal law typically recognizes defenses based on mental capacities in one 
of two primary ways. First, an accused can be completely dissolved of criminal 
responsibility due to mental incapacity.251 For example, a mental disorder can excuse 
 
244. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), superseded by 
statute, Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. 
245. Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 
10 (1980). 
246. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 3 (discussing provocation as a partial defense). 
247. Id. at 311–12, 317–18, 343–53 (8th ed. 2018) (discussing involuntary intoxication, insanity, 
and diminished capacity). 
248. See generally Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
supra note 145. 
249. May, 345 U.S. at 536 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
250. 567 U.S. 460, 477–79 (2012). 
251. Arlie Loughnan, Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1,  
2–3 (2012). 
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criminality through the defense of insanity, or a child’s immaturity can excuse guilt 
under the common law infancy defense.252 In these situations, the defendant’s 
mental disorder or childhood “serves to identify such a breakdown of the normal, 
human capacities of judgment and practical reason that the afflicted person cannot 
fairly be held liable.”253 Second, diminished culpability due to an internal mental 
state or external circumstances can mitigate the severity of a criminal conviction, as 
when someone acts in the “heat of passion.”254 For example, murder can be reduced 
to manslaughter if a homicide is committed due to an extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance, or due to provocation.255 Under this approach, the criminal conduct is 
not completely excused, as in the case of insanity. Rather, it is partially excused and 
is treated as less severe.256  
The law requires that characteristics attached to a defendant’s youth be taken 
into account in some situations.257 Age must be considered in the objective analysis 
of custody in Miranda cases.258 Mitigating evidence and characteristics of adolescent 
development must be considered before LWOP sentences are imposed for 
juveniles.259 Further, a handful of courts have employed “reasonable adolescent” 
standards in criminal cases that require an objective analysis of reasonableness.260 
Some scholars have suggested that juvenile accountability should be measured 
according to specialized standards appropriate for their developmental stage 
because otherwise, “jury instructions presuppose an adult’s conduct and thought 
processes,” and decision-makers impose their own (adult) capacities for  
decision-making on the analysis of adolescent behavior.261 Standards applicable to 
 
252. See Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA  
L. REV. 503, 510–12 (1984); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 
29 (1990) (discussing infancy as an excuse). 
253. SANFORD H. KADISH, Excusing Crime, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 99 (1987). 
254. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 501–11 (8th ed. 2018). 
255. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. 1980) (stating that extreme 
emotional disturbance reduces murder to manslaughter); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at  
128–29 (discussing how a mental illness that distorts thinking but does not rise to the level of insanity 
can reduce the severity of the offense, and how provocation or coercion can reduce murder  
to manslaughter). 
256. DRESSLER, supra note 3, at 501–11 (8th ed. 2018). 
257. See infra notes 258–260 and accompanying text. 
258. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011). 
259. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
260. In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); see also J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 
115, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (adopting a “reasonable person of similar age, intelligence, and 
experience” standard to assess whether the juvenile defendant acted with extreme indifference to the 
value of human life). 
261. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 47, at 159 (proposing a standard of developmental 
negligence informed by adolescent development research); SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 139 
(arguing for mitigation due to “diminished capacity” based on developmental stage of adolescence 
because adolescents are a “well-defined group, whose development follows a roughly predictable 
course to maturity and whose criminal choices are affected predictably in ways that are mitigating of 
culpability”). This approach shares some similarities with Barry Feld’s “youth discount” 
recommendation for juvenile sentencing. Feld’s proposal for a youth discount would categorically 
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adolescents as a group are the only way to incorporate brain development research 
into the law because the neuroscientific research thus far has only been able to 
“provide[ ] group data showing a developmental trajectory in brain structure and 
function during adolescence and into adulthood.”262 According to experts, at this 
point, “the research does not currently allow us to move from that group data to 
measuring the neurobiological maturity of an individual adolescent because there is 
too much variability within age groups and across development.”263 Thus, 
individualized expert opinions about the capacity of particular defendants in relation 
to others of the same age would be “exceeding the limits of science.”264  
Clear standards that require decision-makers to consider the unique 
characteristics of youth could import the research into the law. Providing specific 
direction in this way would limit the overriding tendency of adults to impose their 
own capacity for reasoning on their assessment of a juvenile’s reasoning. For 
example, in recommending a standard of developmental negligence for juveniles, 
Kim Thompson-Taylor proposes the following jury instruction:  
In deciding whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent in this 
case, you may take his age into consideration in assessing whether he had 
reached a level of development that enabled him to form the specific intent 
to kill. You may consider whether developmental immaturity prevented 
him from exercising the sort of judgment in which he fully appreciated the 
risks involved or the potential outcome of his acts. If you find that the 
defendant lacked the capacity to form the specific intent in this case, you 
must find him not guilty and may proceed to consider whether the state 
has met its burden of proof with respect to the lesser included offense of 
assault with a dangerous weapon.265 
Applying a similar approach to the major participant and reckless indifference 
standards could take a variety of forms. Guidance could be provided regarding how 
to apply the factors that are most affected by developmental research. For example, 
the following could attach to the analysis of knowledge that death could result from 
the involvement in the felony:  
In determining whether the defendant acted with this knowledge, you must 
consider that adolescents as a group are categorically less capable than 
adults of understanding the consequences that are likely to result from their 
actions. Thus, in all but the most unusual cases, an adolescent will not be 
 
reduce sentences in relation to a defendant’s age, thus folding “the principle of youthfulness as a 
mitigating factor” into sentencing rules. Feld argues that the youth discount would “hold youth 
accountable and recognize their diminished responsibility without excusing their criminal conduct.” See 
Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, 
Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 316 (2013). 
262. Bonnie & Scott, supra note 144, at 161. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 47, at 164–65. 
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able to appreciate that participating in a felony, including an armed 
robbery, presents a risk to human life.  
In assessing a juvenile’s actions, or inactions, to intervene to prevent the 
violence or to aid the victim, the law could require decision-makers to consider  
the following:  
In cases involving a defendant who was under the age of eighteen at the 
time of the offense, failure to intervene to prevent the violence, to aid the 
victim, or to minimize the harm does not tend to show that the individual 
was a major participant or that he acted with reckless indifference to 
human life. Rather, these are behaviors that are normal and expected  
for adolescents. 
Recognizing that most juveniles do not have the capacity to meet these 
standards, a rebuttable presumption that juvenile accomplices do not fill the 
requirements of being major participants or acting with reckless indifference to 
human life could be created to more fully acknowledge these limitations of 
adolescents as a group. A presumption would recognize that most juveniles are 
incapable of engaging in the same type of reasoned decision-making as are adults. 
This would not completely excuse their behavior, because they could still be 
convicted of the underlying felony offense, but it would limit murder convictions 
for accomplice-based felony murders to only the most sophisticated juveniles, 
where evidence of their understanding of the risks and ability to intervene to stop 
their confederates can be clearly proven.  
Since the major participant and reckless indifference analysis is subjective, 
mitigating evidence that bears on the subjective state of mind of the individual 
should be required, much like the individualized assessments Miller v. Alabama 
requires when courts are considering imposing LWOP sentences for juveniles.266 
Attorneys would need to present evidence about childhood abuse and trauma, 
which has been shown to reduce impulse control and self-regulation among 
adolescents,267 school performance and behavior, mental health, childhood 
development, experiences of abuse or neglect, exposure to community violence, 
and psychological functioning, at a minimum.268  
B. Limitations of an Individualized Approach 
The case-by-case approaches discussed above, however, may not go far 
enough because it is very difficult for decision-makers to separate their reactions to 
 
266. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
267. Kathryn C. Monahan, Kevin M. King, Elizabeth P. Shulman, Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurie 
Chassin, The Effects of Violence Exposure on the Development of Impulse Control and Future Orientation 
Across Adolescence and Early Adulthood: Time Specific and Generalized Effects in a Sample of Juvenile 
Offenders, 27 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1267 (2015). 
268. See Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating Evidence 
for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391 (2012) (arguing that failing to present mitigating 
evidence about a juvenile client facing prosecution in adult court amounts to ineffective assistance  
of counsel). 
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the tragic harms that have resulted in these cases from the culpability analysis.269 In 
cases involving death, there is a serious risk that decision-makers will focus on the 
harm caused, rather than on the proper focus of the legal analysis. This concern 
motivated the Supreme Court to adopt a categorical ban on the death penalty for 
juveniles and on life without parole sentences for juveniles who have not killed.270 
According to the Court, a categorical bar was required because “[a]n unacceptable 
likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime 
would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even 
where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true 
depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.”271 This tendency for 
logical reasoning to be overwhelmed by emotional reactions to tragic crimes may 
be one reason why felony murder rules have persisted despite their “rational[ ] 
indefensib[ility]” in light of a defendant’s culpability.272 The disturbing facts that 
inevitably surround a homicide can misdirect the focus of the analysis to the harm 
caused rather than to the defendant’s actions and mental state.273  
In addition, even with specific guidelines that require the consideration of 
adolescent development principles, there remains a risk of systematically ascribing 
the awareness typical of adults to people whose brains operate differently.274 This is 
a phenomenon that is evident in parole hearings for young offenders, where a 
growing number of states require the consideration of the diminished culpability of 
youth in parole suitability hearings.275 For example, California requires the Board of 
Parole Hearings to “take into consideration the diminished culpability of juveniles 
as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth 
and increased maturity of the individual.”276 The guidelines are specific, and they 
incorporate adolescent development research. Nonetheless, they still require some 
subjective analysis as decision-makers apply the standards to the facts of individual 
 
269. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court rejected a case-by-case approach to assessing culpability, 
reasoning that a categorical rule was necessary to prevent decisionmakers from being unduly influenced 
by the “brutality” or “cold-blooded nature” of the crime. 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005). 
270. Id. at 578 (barring the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560  
U.S. 48, 73, 77–78 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573) (adopting a categorical bar against imposing 
life without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles in nonhomicide cases). 
271. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
272. Sanford H. Kadish has characterized the felony murder rule as rationally indefensible. 
Kadish, supra note 45, at 695–96. 
273. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
274. As Kim Taylor-Thompson warns, when decision-makers are asked to “infer the actor’s 
mental state from the circumstances surrounding the offense,” they “may be influenced by [their] own 
preconceptions of both human behavior and justice,” and by jury instructions that “presuppose an 
adult’s conduct and thought processes even when the behavior under scrutiny is that of an adolescent.” 
Thus, “considerable gaps in interpretation may emerge between the accused and those evaluating her 
behavior.” Taylor-Thompson, supra note 47, at 158–59. 
275. See Beth Caldwell, Creating Meaningful Opportunities for Release: Graham, Miller and 
California’s Youth Offender Parole Hearings, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 248–49 (2016) 
(discussing specialized parole rules and procedures for young offenders in California, Connecticut, West 
Virginia, and Massachusetts).  
276. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2019). 
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cases.277 Parole Commissioners demonstrate challenges with accepting the 
legitimacy of the adolescent mental states people describe when recounting their 
thoughts and behaviors when they were young.278  
For example, the California Court of Appeals reviewed the transcript of one 
youth offender parole hearing where throughout the hearing 
[t]he commissioners rejected petitioner’s attempts to explain his perceived 
need to prove himself and lack of regard for the value of life or 
consequences of his actions, seeking logical, rational reasons for 
petitioner’s conduct that failed to allow for, much less give great weight to, 
the mindset of a 19-year-old drug dealer immersed in a violent,  
criminal lifestyle.  
Rather than take his explanations regarding his thought process when he was 
younger at face value, the commissioners consistently substituted their logical, adult 
decision-making.279 
The risks of adult decision-makers imposing their own perspectives on the 
analysis of whether a juvenile had the requisite subjective awareness or knowledge 
at the time of the offense would pose a significant challenge to the  
case-by-case approach. 
C. Categorical Bar 
A categorical rule like the Supreme Court has adopted in other juvenile cases 
would be the better approach to resolving this disconnect between the scientific 
research and the law.280  
In light of the research that clearly demonstrates that adolescent  
decision-making is fundamentally different from that of adults, Professor Kim 
Thomas argues in a recent law review article that juvenile offenders should not be 
prosecuted for criminal offenses requiring a reckless mens rea.281 Professor Thomas 
argues that young people “cannot conform to the criminal law expectations 
regarding anticipation of the consequences of their risky behavior, which is central 
to culpability in cases involving a reckless mens rea or the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine.”282 The same applies in the felony murder context. Barring 
 
277. See Caldwell, supra note 275, at 276–80 (summarizing the statistically significant factors in 
parole eligibility determinations for youth offenders). 
278. In re Poole, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754, 761 (Ct. App. 2018). 
279. Id. at 767. 
280. Scott and Steinberg recommend a diminished capacity defense based on mitigating 
conditions accompanying youth, and conclude that a categorical approach is more appropriate than 
individualized assessments because “the capacities and processes associated with adolescence are 
characteristic of individuals in a relatively well-defined group, whose development follows a roughly 
predictable course to maturity and whose criminal choices are affected predictably in ways that are 
mitigating of culpability.” SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 139. 
281. See Thomas, supra note 48. 
282. Id. at 1691. 
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prosecution of juvenile accomplices in felony murder cases is the only solution that 
fully reconciles the research on the diminished capacity of adolescents with the law. 
The Supreme Court has reasoned that “[t]he susceptibility of juveniles to 
immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible conduct is not as 
morally reprehensi[ve] as that of an adult.’”283 When this is considered in relation to 
the widely recognized lesser culpability of accomplices to felony murder, the case 
for a categorical bar becomes stronger. 
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court reasoned that “when compared to an 
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice 
diminished moral culpability. Age and the nature of the crime each bear on the 
analysis.”284 The Court’s reasoning about the diminished culpability in nonhomicide 
cases drew on Enmund, a felony murder case, to highlight the diminished culpability 
that applies not only in cases where no one is killed,285 but also in cases where the 
defendant did not “intend to kill or foresee that life will be taken.”286 Juveniles facing 
liability for felony murder as accomplices share this “twice diminished culpability,” 
pointing towards the need for a categorical bar like the Court adopted in Graham.287 
Further, the risk of disparate racial impacts resulting from implicit racial bias 
that decision-makers inevitably bring to individualized assessments underscores the 
importance of a categorical rule. An emerging body of research about implicit bias 
reveals that “the integrity and legitimacy of any individualized decision-making 
process is vulnerable to contamination from racist attitudes or from unconscious 
racial stereotyping that operates even among those who lack overt prejudice.”288 
Implicit racial biases are unconscious stereotypes people associate with specific 
racial groups.289 The existence of implicit bias is well documented and pervasive.290 
It is particularly influential in the criminal justice arena. According to L. Song 
Richardson, “[t]here is copious evidence that individuals of all races have implicit 
racial biases linking blacks with criminality and whites with innocence.”291 These 
biases have been shown to “influence the behaviors and judgments of even the most 
egalitarian individuals in ways that sustain problematic and unwarranted racial 
disparities.”292 Judgments shaped by unconscious racial biases result in systemically 
 
283. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487  
U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
284. 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010). 
285. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
286. Graham, 560 U.S. at 69. 
287. Id. at 69, 74. 
288. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 17, at 141. 
289. See L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 126 YALE 
L.J. 862, 876 (2017). 
290. See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert  
J. Smith eds., 2012). 
291. Id. at 876. 
292. Id. at 876–77. 
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harsher results for youth of color, including a tendency to discount developmental 
immaturity when considering their behavior.293  
These disparities are evident in the disproportionate numbers of youth of 
color in both prosecutions of juveniles in adult court and prosecutions under the 
felony murder doctrine. For example, eighty percent of all juvenile offenders serving 
life or virtual life sentences are people of color, with over fifty percent being 
Black.294 A small study in Florida found that ninety-five percent of those prosecuted 
for felony murder in a three-year period were Black.295  
Racial disparities are endemic in the U.S. criminal justice system and exist at 
every level, from arrest to prosecution to sentencing.296 As this Article has discussed, 
the accomplice-based felony murder doctrine is of questionable utility and 
legitimacy even absent the consideration of its disproportionate applicability to 
Black defendants. When seen in light of the fact that it is employed almost 
exclusively against people of color, and especially toward Black men, the practice is 
even more troubling.297 Indeed, this could explain the doctrine’s persistence, 
highlighting even more urgently the need for change. The risks of implicit bias 
skewing the outcomes of a case-by-case approach underscore the need for a 
categorical approach that exempts juvenile accomplices from felony  
murder liability.298  
CONCLUSION 
California’s groundbreaking reforms to its felony murder rule, which limit 
accomplice liability to the most extreme cases, mark an important step forward in 
mitigating the harms posed by felony murder laws.299 Eliminating the practice of 
prosecuting juvenile accomplices under felony murder theories of liability would 
bring even greater proportionality into this area of the law, and would mitigate the 
extreme imbalance between the severity of the punishment and the individual’s 
culpability that manifests in these cases.  
 
293. See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of  
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 418 (2013); Sandra 
Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 483, 500 (2004). 
294. NELLIS, supra note 15, at 17. 
295. See Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31 
B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1118–19 (1990). 
296. Angela J. Davis, Introduction to POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, 
AND IMPRISONMENT, at xi (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017). 
297. See Kat Albrecht, Data Transparency & the Disparate Impact of the Felony Murder Rule, 
DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2020/08/ 
data-transparency-the-disparate-impact-of-the-felony-murder-rule/ [https://perma.cc/AE83-9HVS] 
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298. See Richardson, supra note 289, at 882. 
299. S. 1437, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (enacted in CAL. PENAL CODE  
§ 189(e) (West 2010 & Supp. 2019)). 
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Given the widespread criticisms of felony murder rules, and accomplice-based 
felony murder rules in particular, other states will be looking to California as a model 
for reform.300 Thus, this is an issue of importance not only to the thousands of 
accomplices serving life in prison for felony murder in California, but also to the 
rest of the country.  
There is a widely articulated normative sense that accomplice-based liability 
for felony murder is unjust, particularly when the defendants are juveniles.301 Failure 
to address the glaring problems highlighted in these cases risks undermining the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole.302  
 
300. See, e.g., Jesse Paul, Colorado Poised to Revisit Murder Law that Can Send People to Prison 
for Life—Even When They Didn’t Kill Anyone, COLO. SUN ( Jan. 6, 2020, 5:10 AM), https://
coloradosun.com/2020/01/06/colorado-felony-murder-law-change-2019/ [https://perma.cc/MB9C-X452] 
(acknowledging that “Colorado’s forthcoming reexamination of felony murder comes on the heels of 
efforts in other states to take a second look at their felony murder statutes” and specifically discussing 
California’s reforms to its felony murder rules). 
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